Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (2000– )
2015

State of Utah, Plaintiff/Appellant, vs. Michael Rowan & Rebecca
George, Defendant/Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah vs. Rowan and George, No. 20150598 (Utah Supreme Court, 2015).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3266

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (2000– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Appellant,
vs.

Case No: 20150598-SC

MICHAEL ROWAN &
REBECCA GEORGE,
Defendant / Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEES
STATE’S APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, FROM ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF CHARGES AGAINST
DEFENDANTS AFTER THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO SUPPRESS, BEFORE THE HONORABLE DEREK P. PULLAN
JEFFREY S. GRAY
Assistant Attorney General
SEAN REYES
Utah Attorney General
Appeals Division
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Counsel for Appellant

RICHARD P. GALE
2155 N. Freedom Blvd.
Provo, Utah 84604
DOUGLAS J. THOMPSON
(12690)
Utah County Public Defender Assoc.
Appeals Division
51 South University Ave., Suite 206
Provo, UT 84601
dougt@utcpd.com
Counsel for Appellees

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................. ii
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT .......................................................................................1
ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION ............................................. 2
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS .................................................................... 4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case ................................................................................................ 5
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition ............................................................ 5
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS ................................................................................ 7
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 11
ARGUMENT
I. The warrant was issued without probable cause and without a substantial basis to find
probable cause
A. Relevant Standard of Review ...................................................................................13
B. Relevant Search and Seizure Law ........................................................................... 18
C. Application
1. Did the affidavit establish probable cause? .........................................................21
2. Did the magistrate have a substantial basis? ..................................................... 26
II. The Utah Constitution requires exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
A. Larocco, Sims, Thompson, Debooy ........................................................................ 28
B. This Court should not overturn its precedent
1. Stare decisis ........................................................................................................ 29
2. The text of the Utah Constitution supports exclusion ........................................31
3. The historical context supports exclusion ......................................................... 35
III. This Court should not recognize a good-faith exception to Utah’s
exclusionary rule
A. Prior Utah precedent implicitly shows there is no good-faith exception .............. 40
B. A good-faith exception is inconsistent with the text of Utah’s
Constitution ............................................................................................................. 42
C. A good-faith exception is inconsistent with the purposes of the
exclusionary rule ..................................................................................................... 43
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT ........................................................................... 45
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24
ADDENDA
Utah Const. Art. I, Sect. 14
United States Constitution, Amend. 4

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code §78A-3-102 .........................................................................................................1
Utah Const. art. I, §14 ............................................................................................... passim
Utah Const. art. IV, §10 ..................................................................................................... 17
FEDERAL CASES
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed.2d (1886) ................ 36,37,38,39
Brown v. Illinios, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) ........................... 43
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) ................................................................................. 2
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) ......................16
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) ........................................................ 33
Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984) ..............13
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)............................................................... 43
United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) ................. 25
United States v. Kinison, 710 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2013) ................................................... 25
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) ........... 6,43,44
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) .............16
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 653 (1914)........................ 44
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)................ 43
STATE CASES
Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471 (Utah 1939) ......................................................................19
Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 110 P.2d 355 (Utah 1941) ..............................................13
Eldridge v. Jandrow, 2015 UT 21, 345 P.3d 553........................................................... 3,29
State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704 (1923) ................................................................ 32
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996)............................................................. 17,37
State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 103 P.3d 699 ........................................................................14
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992) ......................................................................... 2
State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 3 , 996 P.2d 546 ................................................................ 41,42
State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986) ....................................................................21
ii

State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, 332 P.3d 937 .......................................................................... 2
State v. Guard, 2015 UT 96 ................................................................................................ 3
State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052 (N.M. 1993) ................................................................ 44
State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992) ............................................................. 43,44
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) ......................................................................... 18
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) ........................................................ 28,29,30
State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, 48 P.3d 872 ................................................................... 2,13
State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987)............................................................... 44
State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App 1993) ............................................................ 2,26
State v. Royball, 2010 UT 34, 232 P.3d 1016 ................................................................... 24
State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, 104 P.3d 1265 ................................................................. 25
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) .................................................. 28,29,30,40
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)................................................................. 29
State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, 267 P.3d 210............................................................... 2,29,38
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Dale Morgan, State of Deseret, Utah Historical Quarterly, 8 (1940) .............................. 35
Douglas Laycock, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 1 (4th ed. 2010) ......................... 35
Martin Hickman, Utah Constitutional Law, 40-78 (unpublished doctoral dissertation
available at the University of Utah J. Williard Marriott Library and the Brigham Young
University Harold B. Lee Library) .................................................................................... 36

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

Case No: 20150598-SC

MICHAEL ROWAN,
REBECCA GEORGE,
Defendants / Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
****
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in the case involving
Defendant Rowan pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code §78A-3-102(3)(i) as
an appeal from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree
felony. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in the case involving
Defendant George pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code §78A-3-102(3)(b) as a
case certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final
judgment by the Court of Appeals. The Court consolidated the cases on
November 20, 2015 after a stipulated motion by the parties.1

The trial court prepared a record for each defendant on appeal. Many of the
pleadings were duplicated and are contained in each record, however, there are
some documents only found in Rowan’s record. To the extent that some of the
relevant documents are not contained in one record or another the defendants do
1

ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
1. Whether the trial court erred when it found the warrant affidavit did not
support probable cause. This Court will “review a district court’s assessment of a
magistrate’s probable cause determination for correctness and ask whether the
district court erred in concluding that the magistrate did not have a substantial
basis for his or her probable cause determination.” State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53,
¶12, 267 P.3d 210. It will review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion
to suppress based on an illegal search as a mixed question of law and fact. State
v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ¶17, 332 P.3d 937. “We review the factual findings
underlying a grant of a motion to suppress evidence under a ‘clearly erroneous’
standard, and review the trial court’s conclusions of law based thereon for
correctness.” State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah App 1993) (citing State v.
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Utah 1992)).2

not claim the State has failed to preserve or provide an adequate record. The
cases have been consolidated on appeal and defendants will treat the records as
though they are one combined record. In order to be consistent with the State’s
brief, citations to the electronic record from Michael Rowan’s case will be
designated by the letter “R”, and citations to the electronic record from Rebecca
George’s case will be designated by the letter “G”.
2 Defendants contend that the “substantial basis” standard of review can be
attributed to the United States Supreme Court’s interpretations of Fourth
Amendment cases. See State v. Norris, 2001 UT ¶14, 48 P.3d 872 (the line of
cases leads to Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527
(1983)). Because this case is being decided under the Utah Constitution, and
because this Court has not yet disclosed the Utah standard of review involved in a
district court’s assessment of a magistrate’s probable cause determination in
issuing a warrant, Defendants suggest using the simple standard of review this
Court has applied in similar circumstances: the factual questions for clear error;
2

The question of probable cause was preserved, to the extent it was
preserved, by the “State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress”. R.04153. In its response, the State preserved four arguments: (1) the “CI” demonstrated
sufficient credibility; (2) probable cause supported the search of “All Persons, All
Residence”; (3) the officer corroborated the “CI” information; and (4) even with
probable cause the Leon good-faith exception should apply. Any other probable
cause arguments were not preserved by the State.3
2. Whether this Court should reverse its prior holdings that article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution requires exclusion of evidence obtained from
illegal searches and seizures. The State’s suggestion, that the existence of a state
exclusionary rule is merely a matter of constitutional interpretation reviewed for
correctness, is only half right. State’s Brief at 3. In reality, this Court is not only
interpreting the Utah Constitution, it is deciding whether its current precedent
regarding the Utah Constitution should be abandoned. In this circumstance the
Court reviews challenges to its former interpretations of the Utah Constitution in
light of the doctrine of stare decisis, and it will not overrule its precedents lightly.
State v. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶33. Although courts of last resort are not bound to
mechanically apply stare decisis, the “presumption against overruling” precedent
is “weightier” in some cases. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶33 (citing Eldridge v.
Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶22, 345 P.3d 553).
and the existence of probable cause for correctness. An argument supporting this
standard will be made below.

3

The State preserved this issue in its Response to Address Good Faith
Exception Under Utah Constitution, where it argued the trial court should
“abandon the precedent regarding the exclusionary rule under article I, section
14, of the Utah Constitution” because the precedent lacked “proper scrutiny”.
R.102. The State preserved the arguments that the Utah exclusionary rule is not
supported by the text of section 14, the history of the constitutional convention
does not support exclusion, section 14 is not self-executing, and exclusion
constitutes bad public policy. R.104-10.
3. Whether this Court should create an as-yet unrecognized good-faith
exception to Utah’s exclusionary rule. The trial court declined to do so and this
Court reviews a request to create an exception to the Utah Constitution for
correctness.
The request was preserved by the State in its Response to Address Good
Faith Exception Under Utah Constitution where it argued the trial court should
apply the interstitial model of constitutional analysis, thereby foregoing any
analysis of whether any independent good-faith exception applies to Utah’s
Constitution. R.112-28. The State also argued a good-faith exception should apply
to Utah’s Constitution because the exclusionary rule, like the federal rule, “is a
judicial remedy designed to deter future constitutional violations by law
enforcement” and “not a constitutional requirement.” R.131.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in full in the Addenda.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
The State of Utah appeals from the final order of the district court
dismissing the charges following the suppression of evidence that substantially
impaired the State’s ability to proceed to trial. The trial court ruled that the police
illegally obtained evidence during an unlawful search of the defendants’ home.
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Michael Rowan (Rowan) was charged with (1) Distribution of or Arranging
to Distribute a Controlled Substance (marijuana) in a Drug Free Zone; a second
degree felony; (2) Possession of a Controlled Substance (marijuana) with Intent
to Distribute with Prior Conviction in a Drug Free Zone, a first degree felony; (3)
Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance (psilocybin) with Prior Conviction in
a Drug Free Zone, a first degree felony; (4) Possession or Use of a Firearm by
Restricted Person, a third degree felony, and (5) Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor. R.001-02. Both
Rowan and Rebecca George (George) were charged with (5) Endangerment of a
Child or Vulnerable Adult, a third degree felony. R.002, G.002.
Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search of their
home, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause under both
the state and federal constitutions. R.027-37. The State opposed the motion.
R.263-68; G.104. After argument, the trial court denied the motion, concluding
that the warrant was not supported by probable cause, but refused to suppress

5

the evidence under the federal good faith exception articulated in United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). R.226-32,269-81; G.84-78,105.

Defendants

subsequently supplemented their argument and asked the trial court for a ruling
on the question of the good faith exception under the Utah constitution. R07080. In response, the State argued that there is no basis for an exclusionary rule
under the Utah Constitution and, even if there were, it should include a goodfaith exception analogous to the federal exception. R.088-146. The trial court
heard additional argument and then granted the Defendants’ motion to suppress,
declining to overrule the state exclusionary rule, and declining to recognize a
good-faith exception. R.180-94, 282-90; G.51-37.
On the State’s motion, the trial court dismissed the charges against
Defendants on the ground that the suppression of evidence substantially
impaired the State’s cases. R.241, 247; G.92,98.
The State timely appealed both cases. R.251-52; G.101-100. After this Court
elected to retain the Rowan case on its docket, the court of appeals certified the
George case for transfer to this Court. R.306.

6

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS4
1. On August 28, 2012, a district court judge authorized a search warrant for a
residence located at [address deleted] in Provo, Utah.
2. The warrant issued based on the supporting affidavit of Officer Steven O. Pratt
of the Springville Police Department.
3. Law enforcement officers executed the warrant on the same day it issued.
4. The information supporting the warrant came primarily from a confidential
informant. (“the Confidential Informant”).
5. The Confidential Informant was cooperating with the police in exchange for
leniency on pending charges. (Affidavit, ¶4). [Found in the record at R.062].
6. The Confidential Informant told police that a person named Mike was in
possession of marijuana and would sell it to the Confidential Informant.
(Transcript of June 17, 2014 Pretrial Conference, p.2, lines 11-13). [Found in
the record at R.272].
7. The Confidential Informant stated that he had been in Mike’s home in the past,
but did not say when. (Transcript, p.2, lines 13-15). [Found in the record at
R.272].

Defendants take the first section of this Statement of Relevant Facts verbatim
from the trial court’s “Findings of Fact” within its ruling on the motion to
suppress, most of which refer to the transcript of a hearing at which the court
made oral findings. R.227-30. Because the State has not alleged any errors in the
trial court’s factual findings, and neither do Defendants, this is the most accurate
statement of facts available. To the extent the State has taken away from or added
to the trial court’s findings, without making a challenge thereto, this Court should
ignore the State’s factual recitation.
4

7

8. The Confidential Informant stated that he had purchased drugs from Mike.
(Transcript, p.2, lines 15-16). [Found in the record at R.272].
9. The Confidential Informant further stated that (1) Mike sells marijuana in
bulk; (2) Mike’s product is vacuum-sealed; (3) Mike travels to California to
obtain marijuana to sell in Utah; (4) Mike keeps his marijuana in a residence
located at [address deleted] in Provo; (6) Mike is a martial arts master and is
very familiar with the art of combat; (7) the Confidential Informant has heard
Mike speak of firearms in the past, but did not say when; and (8) the
Confidential Informant believed there may be a firearm in Mike’s residence,
but offered no facts to substantiate this belief. (Transcript, p.2-3, 16-25; 1-3).
[Found in the record at R.272-73].
10. The information provided by the Confidential Informant to police purported to
be based in the Confidential Informant’s personal knowledge. (Transcript, p.3,
lines 4-5). [Found in the record at R.273].
11. The police tried to identify Mike by checking records on the residence, vehicle
registrations, and other police records, but were ultimately unsuccessful in
corroborating any of the information that the Confidential Informant provided.
(Transcript, p.3, lines 5-9). [Found in the record at R.273].
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12. The police did not attempt to corroborate independently any of the other
information provided by the Confidential Informant.5 (Transcript, p.3, lines 912). [Found in the record at R.273].
13. Instead, the police arranged for what was intended to be a “controlled” buy,
although the controls were at best slipshod. (Transcript, p.3, lines 13-14).
[Found in the record at R.273].
14. The police searched the Confidential Informant’s person and found no
controlled substances. (Transcript, p.3, line 15). [Found in the record at R.273].
15. The Confidential Informant then made a call to a person the Confidential
Informant identified as Mike. Police monitored the call. (Transcript, p.3, 1517). [Found in the record at R.273].
16. The Confidential Informant agreed to purchase a certain amount of marijuana
for a certain amount of money from the person who was on the phone.
(Transcript, p.3, lines 17-20). [Found in the record at R.273]
17. The sale would take place at the [address deleted] address in Provo.
(Transcript, p.3, lines 20-21). [Found in the record at R.273].

The following was attached as a footnote to the trial court’s finding number 12.
“The failure of the police to corroborate any of the Informant’s information and
failure to ‘control’ the buy in which the Informant participated stand in stark
contrast to representations in the Affidavit. There, the affiant swears that ‘the
[Informant] has provided creditable [sic] information and has not said anything
that would prove false or misleading. The information the [Informant] has given
has been investigated and proved credible.” (Affidavit, ¶4). The only measure
police took to corroborate the Informant’s claims was to conduct a buy which
they failed to control. Other investigation yielded no information. At best, these
representations in the Affidavit are conclusory, at worst misleading.” R.228.
5
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18. Police issued buy money to the Confidential Informant. (Transcript, p.3, lines
21-22). [Found in the record at R.273].
19. For reasons that remain puzzling, police then allowed the Confidential
Informant—a known user of controlled substances whose cooperation with
police was given in exchange for leniency on pending charges—to get back into
his own vehicle and drive to the residence at [address deleted] in Provo.
(Transcript, pp.3-4, lines 23-25, 1-2; Affidavit, ¶7). [Found in the record at
R.273-74, R.062]
20. Police did not search the vehicle for controlled substances before the
Confidential Informant drove to the residence. (Transcript, p.4, lines 3-5).
[Found in the record at R.274].
21. The Confidential Informant went into the house. A short time later, police
observed the Confidential Informant exit the residence. (Transcript, p.4, lines
5-6; Affidavit, ¶8). [Found in the record at R.274; R.062].
22. Again, the Confidential Informant was allowed to drive his own vehicle from
the residence to a predetermined location where he met the police. (Affidavit,
¶8). [Found in the record at R.062].
23. Police searched the Confidential Informant’s person and discovered a
controlled substance. The buy money was not discovered on the Confidential
Informant’s person. Transcript, p.4, lines 6-9; Affidavit, ¶8). [Found in the
record at R.274; R.062].
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24. Police did not search the Confidential Informant’s vehicle after the buy.
(Transcript, p.4, lines 8-9). [Found in the record at R.274].
In addition to the facts specifically noted in the trial court’s findings, the
affidavit in support of the warrant also contained the following relevant
information.
The affiant met the Confidential Informant within “the past 72 hours” of
requesting the warrant. R.062. Although the Confidential Informant claimed “Mike
keeps marijuana inside his residence”, the Confidential Informant admitted he did
not know where it was kept. R.062.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The trial court correctly concluded that the warrant was not supported
by probable cause because the affidavit relied upon conclusory statements,
unspecific information, and a ‘controlled’ buy which was anything but controlled.
The police had no reason to believe the drugs found on the Confidential
Informant did not come from his car which they neglected to search. Even under
the substantial basis standard the trial court would have been correct in
concluding that the magistrate’s
In the alternative, the trial court could have concluded the warrant was
improper because the police omitted crucial information that mislead the
magistrate on issues critical to the determination of the informant’s credibility.
The officer’s alleged that the Confidential Informant was reliable based on his
record of not providing false or misleading information, but the officer’s

11

neglected to admit that the informant had never provided them any information
before, true or false. This omission mislead the magistrate into crediting the
Confidential Informant as a solid source rather than the unproven criminal
looking to gain favor in his own case.
2. This Court should not overrule the Utah cases that recognize the
exclusionary rule in Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The existence of
an exclusionary rule is supported by the text of the Constitution, by the intent of
the framers, and by the historical context at the time of ratification.
3. This Court should not recognize a good-faith exception to Utah’s
exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is not merely a judicially crafted remedy
to deter police misconduct, it is the natural manifestation of the “right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects”. Exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence is the essence of the right. Exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence puts the people back into the state which existed prior to the
violation, it reestablishes a person’s security guaranteed by the language of the
constitution. A good-faith exception undermines these purposes. A good-faith
exception undermines the warrant issuing process by diminishes the incentive
the police have to actually establish probable cause and insulating the reviewing
judges from any scrutiny. A good faith exception obliterates the textual
requirement that “no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause”.

12

ARGUMENT
I. THE WARRANT WAS ISSUED WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE AND
WITHOUT A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS TO FIND PROBABLE CAUSE
A. Relevant Standard of Review
The standard of review may be of interest to this Court as it considers how
to interpret the Utah Constitution and how cases like this one, where a warrant
was issued and then later invalidated after a motion to suppress. The State’s Brief
cites Norris, 2001 UT 104 for the proposition that reviewing courts “afford[]
great deference to the magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant.” State’s
Brief at 3. The State goes on to cite the United States Supreme Court in support of
its claim that this Court will not examine de novo whether or not probable cause
existed, but only whether the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that
probable cause existed. State’s Brief at 3 (quoting Massachusetts v. Upton, 466
U.S. 727, 728, 104 S.C.t 2085, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984)).
“The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is a civil
right.” Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 58, 110 P.2d 355 (Utah 1941) (J. Wolfe
concurring). So too would be the right to be protected from a search warrants
issued without probable cause. The problem with the standard of review
proposed by the State, and imposed by the federal case law, is that is destroys the
probable cause standard, thereby diminishing individual civil rights. The plain
language of the right is that warrants “shall not issue but upon probable cause.”
The obvious meaning of that language is that we have the right not to have a
13

magistrate issue a warrant to search or seize us or our property without probable
cause.
In reality, the standard of review applied under the federal constitution
adds an asterisk to the Fourth Amendment, and in a small font in a footnote the
federal constitution now says “Warrants may actually issue without probable cause so
long as the magistrate has a substantial basis to conclude probable cause may exist,
regardless of whether or not probable cause actually does exist.” How this standard

can be said to protect one of our most inviolate and sacred rights is a mystery.
Probable cause is probable cause. Halfway, or ¾, or 9/10 of the way to probable
cause may be a substantial basis, but it is not probable cause. Any standard that
fails to require probable cause should give pause to a court seeking to follow the
text of the constitution.
Instead of applying the substantial basis standard, as the federal courts
have applied to the federal right, Defendants urge this Court, as it takes the
opportunity to consider the section 14, to apply a standard of review that
adequately accounts for the significance and simplicity of the right the
government has allegedly violated. After all, if the same constitutional right is
afforded a non-deferential correctness review when a search occurs without a
warrant6 (i.e. Did probable cause exist when the police searched an automobile
on the side of the road?), why should the existence of an invalid warrant
See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶15, 103 P.3d 699 (Utah 2004) (this Court
abandoned “the standard which extended ‘some deference’ to the application of
law to the underlying factual findings in search and seizure cases in favor of nondeferential review.”).
6

14

undermine or diminish a person’s right to be free from government interference
with a less demanding standard (i.e. Regardless of probable cause, did the
magistrate have a substantial basis to find probable cause?)? The obvious answer,
the answer that strictly interprets the the language of the constitution is that the
existence of a warrant shouldn’t undermine or diminish the probable cause
standard. Probable cause is probable cause, whether this Court is reviewing a
district court’s finding of probable cause for an automobile search or a
magistrate’s finding of probable cause in the issuance of a warrant, the right is
the same and the review is the same, so too should be the standard of review.
However, the State in its brief and the federal case law support the
distinction between the standard in warrant and non-warrant cases. The State
argues that this Court “may not invalidate the warrant simply because it might
have reached a different result”. State’s Brief at 14. In other words, this Court may
not invalidate a warrant even if the Court finds it was not supported by probable
cause. This is distinct from this Court’s ability and practice to invalidate a search
made without a warrant where it finds it was not supported by probable cause.
Applying this rule, imagine the police are investigating the activity at two
adjoining houses and collect the same amount of evidence in support of their
intended search for each house, evidence which does not support probable cause,
and the police obtain a warrant in one instance and decline to request a warrant
in the other. The house without the warrant is entitled to the full protection of the
probable cause standard, the search of this home would be illegal. But the house
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with the warrant is denied the protection of the probable cause standard, and
some unclear metric, something less than probable cause, justified the search.
According to the State, this distinction is appropriate because “the
resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined
by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” State’s Brief at 14 (quoting United
States v. Vantresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684). In other
words, because we like warrants, if it is a close case where we are not sure
whether or not probable cause existed and there is a warrant, we are going to say
probable cause existed. Apparently, tie goes to the warrant.
It actually goes further than that. The federal courts, in an effort to
encourage the police to request a warrant, have decided to reduce the amount of
evidence needed to support a warrant if the officers are willing to go to the
trouble of requesting it. Vantresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (“this Court, strongly
supporting the preference to be accorded searches under a warrant, indicated
that in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable
where without one it would fall”) (loosely citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 270, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)).7 Put plainly, according to the State

Defendants claim the citation in Vantresca to Jones is loose because page 270 of
the Jones decision does not indicate the evidentiary requirement in warrant cases
was lower than in non-warrant cases. What page 270 does indicate is that
warrants should not require more evidence or “evidence of a more judicially
competent or persuasive character” than would support probable cause without a
warrant, and that in close cases “it is most important that resort be had to a
warrant, so that the evidence in the possession of the police may be weighed by
an independent judicial officer”. Jones, 270. This is very different than saying a
7
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and at least some of the federal case law, a search does not really need to be based
on probable cause if a judge was willing to sign a warrant.
The standard of review distinction between probable cause and the
somewhat lower standard in warrant cases is ruinous to the explicit
constitutional requirement that “no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause.”
This Court should take this opportunity to “support, obey and defend… the
Constitution of this State” by implementing a Utah standard of review that
requires warrants to be supported by probable cause, period. UTAH CONST., ART.
IV, SEC. 10. Even if this Court feels compelled to start its analysis by examining
federal precedent, any such “precedent is certainly not controlling if
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment are inconsistent or confused.” State v.
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d
1196, 1205-06 (Utah 1995)). Federal precedent which interprets the explicit
probable cause requirement and concludes there is a distinction between
probable cause to support a warrantless search and something less than probable
cause to support a warrant is undoubtedly inconsistent and confused. This Court
should feel no obligation follow these cases.
Defendants contend that federal efforts to encourage officers to follow the
constitutional demand for warrants have had the (perhaps) unintended
consequence of diminishing and undermining the rights explicitly provided by

warrant probable cause requires less evidence than non-warrant probable cause,
as Vantresca interprets it.
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our constitution. Any attempt to follow that federal path is at odds with an oath
to support, obey and defend Utah’s constitution. Both as judges and as members
of the bar we have sworn fidelity to the protection of these rights. It is in light of
that duty that appellate counsel urges to the Court to consider this case as a
whole, and specifically the applicable standard of proof.
B. Relevant Search and Seizure Law
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.” UTAH CONST., ART. I, SECT. 14. Despite the simplicity of the language used
in Utah’s constitution, there has been great confusion about what the right
actually means, how it can be vindicated, and under what circumstances the
government can infringe upon the right.
The confusion about the breadth and depth of the federal counterpart found
in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is multiplied many
times over. See State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-72 (Utah 1985) (J. Zimmerman
concurring) (describing the federal search and seizure law as a “labyrinth of rules
built upon a series of contradictory and confusing rationalizations and
distinctions”). It is in this context, the confused and contradictory federal search
and seizure case law, that the Defendants in this case come before this Court
seeking a simple and straightforward application of Utah’s right, as a distinct and
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independent source of protection from government interference in the lives of the
people of Utah.
Based upon the trial court’s ruling and the State’s appeal, the only question
in this section is whether, according to Utah’s constitutional requirements, the
magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude the warrant application
established “probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.” UTAH
CONST., ART. I, SECT. 14.8 Or, if the Court accepts Defendants’ invitation and
applies the constitutionally sound standard of review, the only question is
whether the trial court erred in concluding the affidavit did not establish
probable cause. Defendants assert this Court can answer both of these questions
in the negative.
“Since our Constitution requires a showing of probable cause to support a
search warrant… we hold, in line with the overwhelming weight of authority in
the federal and state courts” that an affidavit is not sufficient if it is made only on
information and belief, and is not corroborated or supported by personal
knowledge. Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 476 (Utah 1939). In Allen, a statute
authorized the issuance of a warrant if the affiant “deposes that he has reason to

The question of whether the affidavit particularly described “the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized” was not address in the court
below and the record does not include any facts about whether the description in
the affidavit is accurate. On its face, the affidavit uses language sufficiently
particularized so as not to trigger any concern. Therefore, Defendants limit their
support argument to the question of probable cause.
8
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believe and does believe the articles are wrongfully held or used.” This Court
concluded that probable cause was not “satisfied by an oath that one has reason
to believe and does believe.” Allen, 97 Utah 471, 475.
Probable cause in Utah is more than suspicion, and it is more than
reasonable belief. Probable cause is defined as an “apparent state of facts that a
discreet and prudent man would be led to the belief that the accused, at the time
of the application for the warrant, was in possession of the property.” Allen, 97
Utah 471, 477 (quoting Cornelius on Search and Seizure, § 83). Defendants assert
that the use of the word “was” in that sentence is crucially important. The term is
not “might be” or even “is likely”, the discreet and prudent person, based on the
information he possesses, believes some set of facts “is” the case. The distinction
between the level of evidence the statute in Allen required and probable cause is
important in this case. Having reason to believe something means there are facts
that one can point to has supporting that belief, thus it is not just a hunch but
based on reason. Reason to believe is not probable cause. Probable cause must be
based upon enough evidence that a discreet and prudent person, a person who
understood that taking a position on the matter will have serious consequences to
the constitutional rights of another person, would be led to believe that a certain
set of facts actually exist.
There are no hard and fast rules delineating what amount of evidence
creates probable cause. Probable cause must be based upon articulated
particularized facts and circumstances and mere conclusory statements will not
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suffice. The foundation of the existence of facts must be shown, the affiant must
disclose the source of the facts, the reason he knows a fact to be true. With those
considerations in mind courts are instructed to consider the totality of the
evidence and make a practical decision whether there is a fair probability that
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. See State v. Espinoza, 723
P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1986).
C. Application
1. Did the affidavit establish probable cause?
The information collected by the police came entirely from CI. And almost
all of the information provided by CI was conclusory, and unsupported by
reference to CI’s knowledge or experience. For example, the State points to the
statement from CI that “Mike” travels to California to obtain marijuana to sell it
in “vacuum sealed” bags. State’s Brief at 16, see R.202, 062. But none of these
facts are supported in the affidavit by reference to how CI knew these facts.
Perhaps there is a possible inference from CI’s statement that he “has been in
Mike’s home in the past and has made drug purchases from him.” R.062. But that
statement gives no time frame, nor does it make any reference to any facts that
could lead the magistrate to suspect CI’s was actually based on observation or
information was recent enough to support ongoing suspicion.
According to the affidavit, the CI did not say he saw drugs in vacuum
sealed packages or give any facts to show how he knew that is how they were
packaged, in fact the CI admitted to the police that he did not know where in the
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house the drugs were kept, suggesting the CI had not seen drugs in the house.
R.062. The affidavit did not include evidence that the drugs CI delivered to the
police were vacuum sealed.
The affidavit did not include a claim that the CI observed Mike drive to
California to purchase drugs, or any other facts from which anyone could
conclude the CI had some personal knowledge about that. Nothing in the affidavit
suggests the police had any information to show CI’s statements about his
interactions with “Mike” were anything more than mere conclusory statements
from CI.
As the affidavit made clear, and as the trial court found, despite their
efforts to confirm CI’s statements by checking records, the officers were
“ultimately unsuccessful in corroborating any information provided by the CI.”
R.202 (emphasis added). The police did not know who “Mike” was, they did not
know of his reputation or know of any prior drug involvements. And the police
did not “attempt to corroborate any other innocent information provided by the
informant.” R.202. The officers were satisfied to accept the CI’s word, which had
not been and could not be verified or supported in any way.
This blind trust in CI’s unsupported statements continued as the officers
had CI arrange to buy drugs. After the police searched his person CI made a
supervised phone call with “Mike”, but that supervision does not describe
whether or how they knew who, if anyone, CI was talking to. R.062. There is no
mention of the number CI dialed, there is no mention making a recording. The
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officers’ supervision of the communication with “Mike” apparently consisted of
listening to CI as he spoke into a cell phone and discussed purchasing “a
predetermined amount of marijuana… for a predetermined amount of money” to
occur at “Mike’s” residence, the same residence the police had not been able to
connect to any person or confirm that anyone named Mike lived there. R.062.
The police then sent CI back into his unsearched car and followed him as
he drove to the house in Provo and then went into the house. There is nothing in
the affidavit suggesting the officers could see what was happening in the house,
or whether or not CI was even met at the door by anyone, it just says he “arrived
at the residence… and went inside.” R.062. “A short time passed and the CI was
seen leaving the residence.” R.062. Other than CI’s presence at the listed address,
the affidavit is devoid of any fact that would support or corroborate any of what
CI later says happened in the house. After CI exited the house he got back into his
unsearched car and drove back to meet up with the police. At that point CI did
not have the money on his person and did have drugs, which he said he bought
from “Mike”. R.062.
The trial court considered three main factors in its totality of the
circumstances review: CI’s reliability, the basis of his knowledge, and the degree
to which CI’s assertions could be corroborated. R.204. In each instance the trial
court found the facts presented were unpersuasive. The State, in its brief, now
argues the opposite inference. State’s Brief at 16-17. However, the State’s
arguments, about the reasons to believe CI, and his incentives to tell the truth,
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are all dependent upon the validity of the controlled buy. For example, the State
argues that CI was a known defendant so he was “exposed to possible criminal
and civil prosecution if the report was false.” State’s Brief at 16 (quoting State v.
Royball, 2010 UT 34, ¶16, 232 P.3d 1016). If anything CI had said could be
verified then perhaps this argument makes sense, but as demonstrated by the
lack of any personal knowledge, CI’s statements to the police were more like the
recitation of rumor than a declaration of facts. CI never told the police he knew or
had personal experience of any of these facts, so in what way could they be false?
The State also argues that CI “risked losing the benefit of leniency in his
criminal case if his report proved to be false.” State’s Brief at 16. Again, there was
no risk to CI because his facts were vague and unchallengeable and the police
allowed him to tell a story and then failed to corroborate any part of it.
What is most flawed about the State’s position regarding CI’s reliability is
its characterization of the information CI provided. Nothing about the affidavit
reflects that the allegations CI reported were “based on his first-hand”
knowledge. State’s Brief at 17. Instead, most of the allegations were merely bare
assertions of fact without explanation of how CI would know it. The details about
“Mike’s” operations were very likely not based on personal knowledge, like the
California detail, or the drugs being stored in some unknown location. The
affidavit reveals the police, and the magistrate, really had no reason to credit CI
with any degree of reliability. As the trial court noted, these weaknesses were
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compounded when the police were unsuccessful in their attempts to
“corroborat[e] any information provided by the CI.” R.202.
Finally, the State suggests CI’s admission that “he himself ‘has made drug
purchases’ from Mike at his home.” State’s Brief at 17. The State relies upon State
v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, ¶18, 104 P.3d 1265, to show that because CI admitted to
committing a crime, that admission created “probable cause to search.” State’s
Brief at 17 (relying upon United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29
L.Ed.2d 723 (1971). But the problem with that position is that the admission here,
that CI purchased marijuana from “Mike” at some unknown time, is far different
than the admissions which created probable cause in Harris. There the Court
conceded that “admissions of crime do not always lend credibility to
contemporaneous or later accusations of another.” Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584. In
fact, it was only because the informant’s admissions there was of an ongoing and
long term illegal activity, “that over a long period and currently he had been
buying illicit liquor on certain premises, itself and without more, implicated that
property and furnished probable cause.” Id. CI’s admission, to having bought
marijuana an undisclosed number of times and no description of when, does not
rise to the level of reliability mentioned in Harris.
The State argues that the arranged drug purchase corroborated CI’s claims
and dismisses the trial court’s concerns about “control” because “an affidavit is
judged on the adequacy of what it does contain” not what a “critic might say
should have been added.” State’s Brief at 19 (quoting United States v. Kinson, 710
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F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 2013)). The State thinks the trial court’s criticism of the
“controlled” buy has to do with what affidavit does not contain, it thinks the court
had doubts about probable cause because it wanted the officers to have done
something other than what they did. That isn’t it. The Court had doubts about
probable cause because of what the officers did do. The officers saw CI drive up in
his car without any idea what was in his car. The officers allowed CI get back into
his car, still having no idea what was in his car. The officers allowed CI to spend
time in the car, alone. This is not a matter of the trial court imagining the perfect
scenario, it is recognizing how the facts recited by the officers failed to show there
was good reason to believe what CI said happened was the truth.
When all these factors are considered, CI’s lack of credibility, the officer’s
failure to corroborate any of his claims, and the complete lack of control over the
buy, the trial court’s conclusion that the affidavit did not establish probable cause
is correct. Compare State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993). This Court
should affirm the trial court’s decision.
2. Did the magistrate have a substantial basis to conclude the
affidavit established probable cause?
As argued above, Defendants contend that the “substantial basis” standard
of review is unconstitutional because it reduces the level of evidence needed to
support a warrant, and that this Court should apply a correctness review on the
question of whether or not the affidavit established probable cause. However, if
the Court is content to apply the federal standard of review, Defendants maintain,
for all the reasons explained above, that the magistrate would not have had a
26

substantial basis to conclude there was probable cause evidence of a crime would
be found in the house.
To the extent that “a substantial basis” for probable cause is a lower
standard than probable cause there are federal cases applying this standard
which demonstrate the lack of substantial basis. For example, in addition to the
concerns argued above, the magistrate would not have had a substantial basis to
concluded probable cause existed because the affidavit contained significant
errors that called into question the officer’s own credibility. For example, the
officer acknowledges he has only recently met CI “in the past 72 hours”. R.062. In
the next paragraph he claims “[t]he CI has provided creditable [sic] information
and has not said anything that would prove false or misleading. The information
the CI has given has been investigated and proved credible.” R.062.
One might ask, what information has been investigated and proved
credible? Obviously it was not the fact that “Mike” lived at the address, because
officers had “attempted through every avenue to try and identify Mike”, including
“[r]ecords checks on the residence, registrations of vehicles, and requesting
information from other agencies”, all of which failed to corroborate CI’s claims.
R.063. It was not the information CI provided about prior drug buys from
“Mike”, nor was it the fact that “Mike” packages his products in vacuum sealed
bags. In fact the only fact that CI provided to the officers that was verified in any
way was the claim that, on the day of the buy, CI bought marijuana from this
unknown person at the house and then CI presented marijuana to the officers.

27

But that corroboration was significantly undermined by the lack of control.
Obviously the drugs could have come from CI, the person “familiar with drug
distribution and drug practices” who was currently seeking “leniency for pending
charges”. R.062.
The magistrate would not have had a substantial basis to believe anything at
all would be found at that house, that “Mike” was a real person, or that anyone,
other than CI, had access to marijuana.
II. THE UTAH CONSTITUTION REQUIRES EXCLUSION OF
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
A. Larocco, Sims, Thompson, Debooy
The State acknowledges Larocco, Thompson, Sims, and Debooy as cases in
which this Court has recognized the independent exclusionary rule for violations
of article I, section 14. State’s Brief at 22-24. And whatever criticism may be made
about the underlying reasoning of any or all of those cases, the fact of the matter
cannot be doubted, the current state of the law in Utah is that “exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of
article I, section 14.” State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) (quoting State
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)). As it stands, the trial court was correct
when it concluded it did not have “authority to depart from binding precedent.”
R.185. Defendants assert that this precedent is still binding, on every court in this
state, unless and until this Court reverses these former decisions.

28

B. This Court should not overturn its precedent
1. Stare decisis
“Stare decisis ‘is a cornerstone of Anglo-American jurisprudence’ because it
‘is crucial to the predictability of the law and fairness of adjudication.’” Eldridge,
2015 UT 21, ¶21 (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993)).
Thus, this Court will not overturn its precedents “lightly”, instead it will only do
so if the precedent is not considered “weighty” because it was not (1) based on
persuasive authority and reasoning, and is not (2) firmly established in the law
since it was handed down. Eldridge, 2015 UT 21, ¶22. The Defendants now assert
that this Court should not overrule the above cited precedent establishing a state
exclusionary rule arising from article I, section 14. Defendants assert the Utah
exclusionary rule was based upon sound authority and reasoning and is firmly
established in Utah’s constitutional case law.
There can be little doubt that this Court’s decision, recognizing the state
exclusionary rule, in Larocco, and repeated in Sims and Thompson, has been the
subject of debate and criticism.9 But that criticism has not resulted in overturning
the precedent. Utah constitutional law, as it currently stands, provides that
“[e]xclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police
violations of article I, section 14.” Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472 (and repeated
verbatim by four justices in State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419).
Because of that status, in order to overturn these cases and reverse course

9

See State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶¶27-58 (J. Lee, concurring).
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away from the constitutional requirement of exclusion, this Court must not only
find that the prior precedent is lightweight enough to be overturned, but it must
also find that it should be overturned, that some alternative to exclusion is a more
sound

and

constitutionally

viable

path.

Defendants

assert

that

the

Larocco/Thompson precedent is weighty enough to withstand scrutiny, and if
not, given the opportunity to determine the scope of our constitutional
protection, this Court should still reach the same result. As the trial court put it,
“[e]ven if it could disregard precedent and strike out on its own, this Court
[should] for the reasons stated below leave the exclusionary rule firmly
ensconced in state search and seizure jurisprudence.” R.185-86.
The State claims the Thompson decision is “not the most weighty of
precedents” because it “did not [analyze(?)] the text or history of Article I, § 14,
and failed to acknowledge, much less explain why it was departing from, this
Court’s long-standing precedent rejecting a state exclusionary rule for violations
of Article I, § 14.” State’s Brief at 23. Defendants’ reading of Thompson is
different. Thompson relied upon the reasoning of Larocco to recognize the
exclusionary rule of section 14, it relied upon Larocco’s explanation. See
Thompson, 419. And Larocco certainly did examine the text of section 14,
considered how the two clauses related to each other and how different courts at
different times have applied different approaches. Larocco, 467.
The State’s position about Thompson begs the question, did “this Court’s
long-standing precedent rejecting a state exclusionary rule” analyze the text or
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history of Article I? This long-standing precedent, State v. Aime, when it rejected
the idea of exclusion, did it consider the 24 years of precedent the text of section
14 had established? To criticize Thompson and ignore the failures of Aime
demonstrates the real crux of the problem with Utah constitutional law in
general. This Court’s decision have not always met the high standard its recent
case law has established. Defendants encourage the Court to take this
opportunity, to leave no stone unturned and issue a decision that will clarify the
meaning of section 14.
2. The text of the Utah Constitution supports exclusion
If the Court is inclined to find that the precedent of Larocco, Sims,
Thompson, and Debooy should not be followed as a matter of stare decisis, and
that the doctrine of an independent state exclusionary rule should be
reconsidered, Defendants believe that this Court’s analysis of section 14 will
reestablish exclusion as the proper remedy for violations of Utah’s search and
seizure protections.
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.” UTAH CONST.,

ART.

I,

SECT.

14 (emphasis added). There are two main

sections, the security section, and the warrant section. Neither of those sections
explicitly require the Court to exclude evidence obtained from a violation of the
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rights. However, Defendants contend that the meaning of the text, the meaning
of the rights, implies exclusion as fundamental to the right.
The plain text requires that no warrant shall issue without probable cause.
But what if a warrant does issue without probable cause? It happens, it happened
in this case. Then what? The State argues that the text of section 14 “does not
impose or otherwise contemplate an exclusionary remedy.” According to the
State, because the text does not explicitly create a rule of evidence making
illegally obtained evidence inadmissible, there is not textual support for
exclusion. State’s Brief at 33-34 (citing Aime, 220 P. at 707). Defendants contend
that exclusion is not the equivalent of a rule of evidence.
Exclusion is not about admissibility; it is not as though illegally obtained
evidence is being excluded because the Court has misgivings about the evidence’s
reliability, as if it were a concern about foundation or authentication.
Admissibility and the rules of evidence have as their aim the admission of reliable
and competent evidence so as to get as near to the truth as possible. Illegally
obtained evidence may be very reliable. In many cases it will be the most reliable
source of evidence about what the defendant is accused of doing. That has no
bearing on the question of whether it should be included at trial. Exclusion is not
about the truth. Reliable or not, exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is about
the fundamental and inalienable rights of the people, and about the fundamental
and invaluable limits on the powers of the government. Exclusion does not make
evidence merely inadmissible, it makes it utterly unavailable to the state.
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Exclusion should forbid the government the power to use the fruits of it crimes in
any way. Exclusion is about undoing the government’s wrongs and re-securing an
individual’s person and property.
Presumably, according to the State’s logic, because section 14 does not
impose or otherwise contemplate any explicit remedy, the rights in section 14 are
merely rights that have no efficacy. State’s Brief at 33. But complaining about the
lack of an explicit remedy creates a problem that need not exist. Defendants
implore the Court to reject this logic as destructive to the fundamental rights we,
as a constitutionally based society, hold most sacred. Instead, Defendants
propose the alternative logic of ‘where there is a right, there is a remedy.’10
Security in one’s home and person and property is its own remedy, the right is
the remedy. Exclusion is the right, because it is the vindication of the right.
Exclusion is the manifestation of the right after the government has broken the
law.
After all, the fact that the government violated Defendants’ right does not
extinguish the rights in section 14. Michael Rowan and Rebecca George are still
entitled to these rights, even today, even years after the government violated their
rights. At this very moment Defendants maintain the right to be secure from
unreasonable searches of their home, past present, and future. That includes the
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the laws, whenever he receives an injury… Blackstone states [that]… ‘it is a
general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.’”).
10
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right in the future to be secure from the consequences of the government’s illegal
conduct. At this moment Defendants maintain the right to demand that judicial
officers not issue warrants to search their home without probable cause, and to
be free from the consequences of prior illegitimate warrants. Security from these
violations means the government cannot continue to violate one’s rights long
after the police drive away from the house.
Exclusion puts the Defendants, whose privacy has been violated, back into
the legal standing they enjoyed before the government destroyed the sanctity of
their home. Exclusion vindicates the ongoing right to privacy, to security in the
home, to security in the privacy of the contents and activities in the home. And
while it may not perfectly accomplish the goal of restoring a person to his previolation status, while his door may still be smashed-in and his property flung
from drawers, exclusion does restore the circumstances by removing the evidence
collected from the violation from the government’s use, exactly where it would
have been if the violation had not occurred. Without exclusion, Defendants’ the
right to security in their home is repeated over and over as the details of their
private lives are exposed, to attorneys and clerks, to jurors and journalists, and to
the public at large. Exclusion stops the government’s ongoing violation; without it
the defendant’s rights are repeatedly violated.
The Utah framers would have understood that including the right to be
secure from unreasonable searches was an actual right, not merely an empty
aspirational goal for the government to do its best to comply with except when it
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didn’t suit their other purposes. The Utah framers would have understood that
security in one’s home and personal effects was an ongoing right and did not end
when after a violation. And in order to give meaning to that right, the framers
would have understood there must be a way to protect and enforce that right, into
the future, especially for those whose rights had been violated.11 The framers, in
light of Boyd (see infra), would have imbued the language of section 14 with an
understanding that security in one’s home includes preventing the government
from using illegally obtained evidence at a trial and continuing the ongoing
intrusion. The framers would have understood that exclusion is part of the right
of the people to be secure from government crimes.
3. The historical context supports exclusion
The Utah Constitution of 1895 was the last in a long line of attempts by the
Territory of Utah/Deseret to become a state. Beginning as early as 184912 the
settlers assembled in constitutional conventions and repeatedly attempted to
establish a constitution. While those efforts resulted in numerous iterations of a
proposed constitution, none of these constitutions were accepted by the United
States until after the Enabling Act passed in 1894. The 1895 version of the Utah
Constitution, including the Declaration of Rights of article I, had been evolving
throughout these forty-five years, usually borrowing portions from other state
See Douglas Laycock, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 1 (4th ed. 2010)
("Remedies give meaning to obligations imposed by the rest of the substantive
law.").
12 See Dale Morgan, State of Deseret, Utah Historical Quarterly, 8 (1940), page
85.
11
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constitutions.13 “The development of Utah constitutional thought thus shows
familiarity with constitutional development on other states, and demonstrates
that Utah, despite her experiments in marriage and economic relationships, was
not ready to depart from the traditional forms of American government”,
including judicial review of constitutional protections. HICKMAN, at 74. This
familiarity would have included judicial review of constitutional protections and
the United States Supreme Court’s decisions.
Right in the middle of that constitutional evolution, in 1886, the United
States Supreme Court considered the case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), where the defendant claimed his Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated by an 1874 law requiring him to produce his
private books and papers in a case against him. He objected to the government
requiring him to provide this evidence but his argument failed and he lost at trial.
In its opinion the Court recalled the “recent history of the controversies on the
subject, both in this country and in England” related to the issuance of writs of
assistance allowing the authorities to search for evidence of smuggled goods.
Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25. The Court concluded that application of the law
constituted an illegal search or seizure and that the Fourth and Fifth Amendment
prevented the federal government from forcing a person to produce evidence in
this manner. Most importantly for the purposes of this case, the Court ordered
See MARTIN HICKMAN, Utah Constitutional Law, 40-78 (unpublished doctoral
dissertation available at the University of Utah J. Williard Marriott Library and
the Brigham Young University Harold B. Lee Library).
13
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that the “judgment of the Circuit Court should be reversed, and the cause
remanded, with directions to award a new trial.” Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 638. That
new trial would have to proceed without the use of the illegally seized evidence
because “its admission in evidence by the court, [was] erroneous and
unconstitutional proceedings.” Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 638. In other words, the
United States Supreme Court, in 1886 ruled that evidence that violated the
Fourth Amendment must be excluded.
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d
1229 (Utah 1996) wrote a thoughtful statement about how the framers of the
Utah Constitution must have felt about the rights they were enshrining in article
I. Because the federal Bill of Rights was not incorporated into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment until much later, “the framers of the Utah
Constitution… viewed their own state constitutional provisions as the sole source
of constitutional protection for those individual liberties enshrined” in our state
declaration of rights. Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1240 (J. Stewart, concurring in the
result). Those framers would not have had any reason to expect that the citizens
of Utah would be protected from state actors by the Fourth Amendment. Because
of that lack of protection, these constitutional authors wanted to protect the
citizens of Utah from the same kinds of state government overreach that the
Fourth Amendment provided from the federal government. If the framers of the
Utah Constitution only wanted the citizens of Utah to be protected from the
federal government and not from the action of state authorities, there would have
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been no need to enact article I, section 14. But they enacted section 14 with an
obvious desire to protect the people of Utah from the actions of the state
government.
This desire would have been made in light of the holding in Boyd, and the
exclusionary function of the language of the Fourth Amendment. It would have
been made in light of the United State Supreme Court’s rejection of the earlier
longstanding proposition that illegally seized evidence could still be admitted.
Instead, understanding that the Fourth Amendment protected Mr. Boyd from the
use of illegally obtained evidence by US Marshalls at his trial, the Utah framers
used nearly identical language to protect Utahans from state actors using illegally
obtained evidence in state cases. In 1895, when the framers of Utah’s constitution
were basing section 14 upon the text and meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
exclusion was part of the Fourth Amendment.
The State points to Justice Lee’s concurring opinion in Walker, 2011 UT
53, ¶49, where he points out that “no appellate court in any state had excluded
unlawfully obtained evidence under its constitution” in 1895. State’s Brief at 37,
fn.4. Presumably this suggests that other states did not believe their constitutions
required exclusion, and therefore neither would have Utah framers. But this fact
means very little because Boyd, and its recognition of exclusionary as a
constitutionally mandated remedy, had only happened in 1886, long after most
states had adopted their constitutions with a pre-Boyd understanding of search
and seizure. The framers of those earlier state constitutions would arguably not

38

have understood their own constitutions, though similar to the federal
constitution, to require exclusion because at the time they were ratified exclusion
was not yet recognized. But in 1895, after Boyd, state constitutional framers, like
those in Utah, who looked to the language of the Fourth Amendment would have
understood that exclusion was part and parcel of the right against illegal search
and seizure.
Defendants dispute the State’s position that exclusion as a constitutional
requirement would have been foreign to the drafters of the Utah Constitution.
Based on the historical setting and the state of the Fourth Amendment after
1889, exclusion was the part of search and seizure. These drafters were well
aware of the Fourth Amendment, and would have been aware of the United
States Supreme Court’s interpretation of it at that time. They would have
understood that, according to Boyd, if evidence had been illegally obtained any
judgment based on that evidence was illegitimate and should result in reversal
and a new trial without the illegal evidence. The framers would have understood
the that the language they enacted would have had the same meaning.
Defendants assert that this Court should not overturn the precedent of
Larocco and Thompson. The Court should reaffirm the authority of the Utah
Constitution to protect our citizens from the unreasonable and unwarranted
intrusions of an at times overzealous government, independent of the
inconsistent and unpredictable federal exclusionary rule. This Court should take
an active role in supporting, obeying, and defending the rights of Utahans as it
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interprets the limits meaning of our own founding document. Defendants asks
the Court to contemplate what security from unreasonable search and seizure
means it if a violation has no consequence. Defendants ask the Court to consider
whether the use of illegally obtained evidence would not be itself another
violation of the right to be secure in one’s home, papers, and effects. Does one
lose the right of security in these places and property for ever after once the
government commits the initial violation? Defendants ask the Court to defend
our right to be secure from government intrusion, even after the intrusion occurs.
Defendants suggest that exclusion of evidence is not a mere remedy tacked on the
back end to try to deter future violations. Exclusion is a continuation of the right,
it is security from unlawful state action even after a violation.
III. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT RECOGNIZE A GOOD FAITH
EXCEPTION TO UTAH’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. Prior Utah precedent implicitly shows there is no good-faith
exception to Utah’s exclusionary rule
While this Court has previously stated that it has yet to decide whether or
not the state exclusionary rule is subject to a good-faith exception. “We leave for
another day the issue of whether to apply in appropriate circumstances a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule to article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.” Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 420. However, without explicitly
denying that a good-faith exception exists, the Court did not recognize one in a
situation where it likely would have applied.
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In State v. Debooy, 2000 UT 546, ¶1, the defendant was convicted of drug
possession charges and appealed his case challenging the constitutionality of a
checkpoint where the police discovered evidence of crimes. The police filed an
application with a magistrate requesting authorization to conduct an
“administrative highway checkpoint” with the intent to inspect or detect traffic
and safety related violations, and “[o]ther alcohol and/or controlled substance
violations.” Debooy, ¶2. The magistrate authorized the checkpoint and the
defendant was investigated when he was stopped. Id, ¶¶3-4. While stopped at the
checkpoint the officers asked consent to search, received it, and discovered
“contraband in a backpack in the trunk.” Id., ¶4.
On appeal this Court found that the section 14 and the Fourth Amendment
have not “always been interpreted the same way” and that this Court “will not
hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction where doing so will
more appropriately protect the rights of this state’s citizens.” Id., ¶12. The Court
considered federal cases examining checkpoints but “solely for their persuasive
value, and [did] not regard them as binding for purposes of state law.” Id, ¶19.
The Court recognized the interest section 14 has in protecting against practices
similar to general warrants where officers were given authority to search without
specified probable cause. Id., at ¶26.
Eventually the Court concluded that the police checkpoint violated section
14 prohibition that against unreasonable searches and seizures in section 14. Id.,
¶33. Implicitly, the court found that the police action was not protected by their
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good-faith reliance upon the magistrate’s authorization. Presumably, if a goodfaith exception were to exist under Utah’s Constitution, Debooy would have been
an opportunity to recognize it.
Defendant’s assert that the erroneous judicial authorization of an
administrative checkpoint that is later executed by the police is analogous to the
issuance of a warrant that lacks probable cause that is later executed in goodfaith by the police. In both instances the constitutional error is caused by the
magistrate authorizing the police action. In both instances the police have done
nothing wrong. In both instances the defendant’s right to be secure from an
unreasonable search or seizure and a warrant without probable cause is violated.
Because this Court did not recognize a good-faith exception to section 14 in
Debooy, it should not recognize one here.
B. A good-faith exception is inconsistent with the text of Utah’s
Constitution
The text of section 14 requires that no warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause. If the Court were to adopt a good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule it would allow the government use warrants issued without
probable cause. A good-faith exception would lower the explicit constitutional
requirement of probable cause with some lower standard. What could be more
offensive to the explicit probable cause standard than to judicially acknowledge
the validity of warrants executed without probable cause? This perversion of one
of the most basic tenants of constitutional law should not be adopted.
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C. A good-faith exception is inconsistent with the purposes of
the exclusionary rule
The State would have the Court adopt the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, (1974)
and find that the only purpose of an exclusionary rule is to deter future
constitutional violations by law enforcement. But such a conclusion would be to
neuter the constitution and ignore the historical meaning of exclusion.
“[T]he Leon holding could not have been reached but for the [U.S.]
Supreme Court’s narrow justification for the exclusionary rule”, that was
accomplished by rewriting history and limiting the purpose of the rule to only
deterring future unlawful police conduct. State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671
(Idaho 1992) (referring to Calandra). In fact, the United States Supreme Court
stated in many cases that the purposes of the exclusionary rule are to protect a
person's Fourth Amendment guarantees by deterring lawless conduct by police
officers and to close the courthouse doors "to any use of evidence
unconstitutionally obtained." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83
S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).14 Rowan now asserts, and many jurisdictions
have agreed, that the U.S. Supreme Court’s “revisionist history of the
14

See also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416
(1975) (the dual considerations of deterrence and judicial integrity are
commonplace purposes of the exclusionary rule); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13,
88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (The exclusionary rule serves to deter
police misconduct and preserve judicial integrity, to prevent the courts from
being “made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by
permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions”); Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960) (The
exclusionary rule also serves “the imperative of judicial integrity.”).
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exclusionary rule” is inaccurate, untrue to the spirit and previously stated
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671. A similar
limited view of article I, section 14, and should not be adopted in Utah. Rather,
unlike the current majority vision of the federal exclusionary rule, Utah’s
exclusionary rule has multiple purposes and justifications beyond deterrence of
future police conduct and creating a good faith exception would defeat those
other purposes and justifications.
The exclusionary rule is a vindication of constitutional rights. As explained
in Weeks, the prosecution’s use of illegally seized evidence involved “a denial of
the constitutional rights of the accused.” Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
393, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). That would have been the same purpose
for exclusion in Boyd, the case upon which the drafters of section 14 would have
based our exclusionary rule.
That same purpose was recognized in New Jersey when its supreme court
rejected the Leon exception too. The exclusionary “rule also serves as the
indispensable mechanism for vindicating the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches.” State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 857 (N.J. 1987). In
New Mexico the supreme court’s finding of an independent exclusionary rule did
not focus “on deterrence or judicial integrity, nor do we propose a judicial
remedy; instead, our focus is to effectuate in the pending case the constitutional
right of the accused to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.” State v.
Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1067 (N.M. 1993).
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With these additional purposes of the exclusionary rule firmly established
in Utah law, based both in history and logic, there is no sense in creating a goodfaith exception. The State’s attempt to do so cannot be said to come from any
reverence to the constitution, but instead from a desire to minimize and dilute
the rights of the people and to enlarge power of the government. Given this
Court’s unique responsibility to the Utah Constitution, this Court should view
such request very skeptically.
Defendants support and reiterate the arguments against a good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule made by the trial court in this case. See R.188194.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Because the trial court correctly concluded the affidavit failed to support
probable cause, and because the magistrate did not have a substantial basis to
find probable cause, this court should affirm the granting of Defendant’s motion
to dismiss. This Court should not reverse its cases recognizing the state
exclusionary rule or create a good-faith exception thereto.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of September, 2016.

________________________
Douglas Thompson
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Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
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Unreasonable searches and seizures.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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